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Abstract 
The paper to be presented discusses the default in policy coordination or 
harmonisation in European Social Policy and the emerging private cost 
borne by migrating individuals. The different designs of national social 
security schemes imply administrative hurdles and incompatibilities.
The latter may also discourage labour movements between EU -
countries since migration could bring about a reduction or a loss of so-
cial security rights acquired on the basis of past employment and past 
contributions. The access to new benefits may be hampered as long as 
some national social security insurance programs demand a minimum 
coverage period as a prerequisite for benefit claims and disregard preced-
ing insurance periods in other countries. 
Taking present EU law into account, we design case studies to identify 
barriers to entry resp. to exit for individuals or households when migrat-
ing from one social security scheme to another. Within these scenarios, 
movements between national systems in Bismarckian tradition and 
Beveridge systems are of great interest.  
The paper is based on a research project conducted at the Centre of Ex-
cellence of International Tax Coordination at the Vienna University of 
Economics and Business Administration. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
While the co-ordination of rules governing labour mobility in the Single Euro-
pean Market was enshrined in one of the earliest EC legislative acts of 1958, the 
matter of social security coverage for migrant workers has only recently been paid 
attention to. The areas of health and long-term care assume specific importance in 
this process: The European Parliament called for greater cooperation in health and 
long-term care. In spring of 2004, it also called on the Commission to present rele-
vant proposals, allowing the Council to apply the “open method of coordination” on 
the subject and to adopt common objectives (see: COM(2004) 304 final 2004, p. 2). 
Given the enormous diversities in organisation as well as in the modalities of fund-
ing in the schemes of social protection in Europe, this task seems to constitute 
quite a challenge. 
Beyond the meta-level, the growing international mobility in Europe has reper-
cussions on the social security position of individual migrant workers. Eventually, 
no migrant worker should be at a disadvantage simply by being employed or resid-
ing abroad, as compared to the immobile counterpart. The paper at hand seeks to 
analyse whether or not the current EC scheme of social security co-ordination 
meets the standards of this principle. 
The paper is divided into four main sections. After a brief topic outline, the fol-
lowing section takes a look at two social protection systems designed in the tradi-
tion of BISMARCK and BEVERIDGE. More specifically, the different setups of the na-
tional long-term care systems in England and in Germany will be analysed. Section 
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three outlines the social security Community Law according to EC Regulation No 
1408/71 (Reg. 1408/71) and its meaning for the co-ordination of long-term care 
provision between England and Germany. Section four presents two case studies to 
illustrate the outcome of co-ordination of benefits in cash and in-kind between the 
two Member States on a microeconomic level. The paper concludes with a summary 
of the results. 
2. BISMARCK and BEVERIDGE: The Provision of Long-Term Care 
This section contains a short statement about the selection of the countries and 
a brief description of the German and English systems of long-term care. 
Motivation. Like most European countries, England and Germany reveal simi-
larities in basic institutions, state of affairs and ascendancies. According to 
HAUSER, differences between countries are decreasing with more congruence in the 
fields of cultural tradition and social values, organisational framework (e.g. market 
economy), democratic institutions as well as processes, characteristic features of a 
welfare state and actual state of economic development and industrialisation (see: 
Hauser 1991, p. 195 et seq.). 
In fact, in a larger perspective almost all European countries show large congru-
encies in the dimensions mentioned above. At the same time, England and Ger-
many are polar cases within the field of social security: Historically, the roots of in-
surance-based social security date back to OTTO VON BISMARCK (1815-1898) 
whereas the idea of public welfare was born by WILLIAM BEVERIDGE (1879-1963) 
in England. Inasmuch, both countries are considered as sub-agents of lager 
BISMARCK- and BEVERIDGE-frameworks. Although today’s social security systems 
of both countries still stem from these organizing frameworks, the polarities have 
diminished rigorously. 
Consequently, Germany and England are a good departure for comparisons 
since they show congruencies in many dimensions affecting the situation of elderly 
people. For instance, both countries exhibit the same old-age ratio1 and similar ad-
justed old-age ratios2. Furthermore expenses for Services for the Elderly and Dis-
abled People differed only 0,063 % of GDP on average in the last three documented 
years (see: OECD: Society at a Glance 2002: OECD Social Indicators). At the same 
time, the two countries differ strikingly in their approaches to ling-term care. If dif-
                                                 
1 Old age ratio = population aged over 65 / population in total working age (15-64) = 24,1 (in 
2000). 
2 Adjusted old age ratio = population aged over 65 / total employment for the age group: 34,2 UK; 
36, 4 D (in 2000). 
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ferences in long-term care policies take effects on the welfare situation of elderly 
people, it should be easiest to expose them in a country case study for the two 
Member States. 
The German Perspective. Following a parliament decision of 1994, a manda-
tory and universal long-term care insurance (Soziale Pflegeversicherung) was intro-
duced throughout Germany one year later by the Dependency Insurance Act (Sozial-
gesetzbuch – Elftes Buch, SGB XI). The Social Dependency Insurance (SDI) was de-
signed in a BISMARCKIAN  tradition in the institutional setting of a pay-as-you-go-
insurance under the roof of the German social security system (see: Schneider 
1999, Scheil-Adlung 1995. Evans-Cuellar/ Wiener 1999, 2000).  
Social long-term care insurance is not conceived as a full-coverage system, but 
as a scheme to assure minimum provision of personal assistance for long term care 
necessities. SDI is mandatory for a significant part of the population, depending on 
salaried employment status and earned income. Wage-and salary-earners and their 
families with an income below the social security contribution ceiling are obliged to 
make contributions to and are entitled to get coverage by care funds (para. 20 (1) , 
SGB XI and para. 8, SGB IV). Civil servants, the self-employed and employees with 
an earned income that allows them to opt out of the mandatory system, are com-
pelled by law to enter into contracts providing for private care insurance.  
Only individuals who comply with the legal requirements of the term in need of 
long-term care (para. 14, SGB XI) are eligible for the full extent of benefits after expi-
ration of the qualification period (para. 33 (2), SGB XI) . SDI guarantees long-term 
coverage to care clients regardless of age, financial need or cause of dependency. 
Furthermore it covers dependency on care resulting from disability, physical or 
mental illness. 
Benefits of the SDI are universal since services are provided for everybody by 
everybody (Titmus 1976, p. 129 quoted from Pratt 2001, p. 258). Benefits in kind 
are intended to be the dominant way of care provision in the German SDI, however, 
care clients can opt for cost reimbursements, as well. (see: Schaaf/ Vogel 1995, p. 
155) In 2003, 49% of all individuals in need of long-term care made use of this op-
tion. (see: Leistungsempfänger der sozialen Pflegeversicherung im Jahresdurch-
schnitt nach Leistungsarten, www.bmgs.de). Long-term care benefits are not sub-
ject to financial assessment. They are graded flat rate benefits, depending on the 
individual’s need of care. Since SDI is not supposed to cover the entire cost of long-
term care provision, supplementary, means-tested benefits can be obtained from 
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welfare schemes on the state and local levels (Sozialhilfe) which are subordinate to 
the social insurance benefits (see: Schulin 1997, cipher 42).  
The English Perspective. As the “Magna Carta of the British welfare state” 
(Lampert 1985, p. 145) the BEVERIDGE-Plan provides the organising framework of 
public welfare. Traditionally, this tax-financed system has always been based on 
means-tested and non-contributory benefits (see: Karlsson 2004, p. 48). 
Generally, every individual living in England is covered by the public welfare 
system if s/he meets the necessary requirements of residence and/ or presence. 
This means that the provision of benefits ceases to exist, as soon as an individual 
leaves the national solidarity community to join another system with different socio-
cultural minimum requirements (see: Schulte 1991, p. 739). 
Public provision for formal long-term care in England dates back several centu-
ries. Apart from private for- and nonprofits, there are two main sources of long-term 
care provision in England, which are the local authorities and the National Health 
Service (NHS). Under the Health and Social Care Act 2001, nursing care  services are 
universal and provided free of charge but personal care services are selective 3 which 
means potential beneficiaries need to satisfy a double criterion for free benefits: The 
individual must actually be in need of care and s/he must have a low income (see: 
Collard 1971, p. 38 quoted from Pratt 2001, p. 258). Generally speaking, all with 
sufficient low income are eligible for services provided by local authorities whereas 
NHS services are usually free of charge, regardless of the individual’s income or as-
sets (see: Robinson 2002, p. 37).  
Unlike Germany, the provision of long-term care in England is not organised in 
a separate universal and mandatory social security scheme (see: Brall 2002, p. 
207). Therefore benefits in kind mainly result from an interaction of different ser-
vices of the NHS and the local authorities whereas the government disburses uni-
versal cash benefits. Resources for social protection are provided in a capped 
budget and concentrated on those individuals with the most need of care  (see: Bal-
dock 2003, p. 121). 
Table 1 briefly juxtaposes the provision of long-term care in Germany and Eng-
land. In the following section the European co-ordination scheme will be applied to 
the two systems.  
 
 
                                                 
3 The benefit is selective in the whole United Kingdom but in England. 
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Table 1 – Comparison of the provision of long-term care in England and in Germany 
Criteria Germany England 
Applicable 
statutory basis 
Social Dependency Insurance  - SDI 
(Gesetzliche Pflegeversicherung): Soci-
al Code (Sozialgesetzbuch), Book XI 
 
Social assistance (Sozialhilfe): 
Federal Social Assistance Act (Bun-
dessozialhilfegesetz, BSHG). 
Social Security Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992. 
Legal objectives  
 
- securing quality of basic primary 
care and home help  
- home care takes priority over sta-
tionary care 
- encouragement of informal care 
potential 
- financial relief for welfare schemes 
- home care takes priority over sta-
tionary care 
- encouragement of informal care 
potential 
- financial relief for social welfare 
institution which provide long term 
care 
Institutions SDI  
Pflegekassen 
 
Social assistance: 
local authorities  
- National Health Service 
- Department of social security  
- local authorities 
Basic principles  SDI: 
Compulsory social insurance system 
financed by contributions, in accor-
dance with compulsory affiliation and 
sickness insurance limits  
 
Social assistance: 
Tax financed 
Non-contributory, state-financed sys-
tem providing cash benefits and bene-
fits in kind for elderly or disabled 
persons and their carers. 
Risk covered SDI: 
Persons in need of care (heath-
assessment) who, as a result of a 
physical, emotional or mental handi-
cap, permanently and regularly need 
substantial long-term assistance to 
execute usual and regularly recurring 
activities in their daily lives.  
 
carer-benefits (contributions to pen-
sion and accident insurance, training, 
respite care) 
 
Social assistance: 
For persons who are  
- are not insured under long-term 
care insurance  
- are insured but the limited benefits 
of long-term care insurance are not 
sufficient (e.g. supplementary 
benefits for cost-intensive most se-
vere category of care).  
These benefits are granted according 
to income and assets. 
Attendance Allowance (cash benefit): 
People aged 65 or over who have per-
sonal care needs during the day 
and/or night because of physical or 
mental disability. 
 
 
 - 7 - 
Field of applica-
tion 
SDI: 
Nearly the entire population is in-
sured. 
 
Social assistance: 
Persons not insured under long-term 
care insurance, insured persons who 
do not meet certain criteria (see 
above) or insured persons receiving 
(supplementary) benefits because the 
limited benefits of long-term care 
insurance (e.g. for cost-intensive most 
severe category of care) are not suffi-
cient or because the insurance does 
not cover certain costs occurring in 
the case of institutional care (costs of 
room and board, investment costs). 
All residents with an unrestricted 
right to remain in the UK. 
Benefits in kind – 
home care 
SDI: 
Monthly benefits in kind (basic care 
and housework provided by itinerant 
care centres or isolated persons) for 
the value of: 
disability level I: 
up to € 384, 
disability level II: 
up to € 921, 
disability level III: 
up to € 1,432, 
in cases of particular hardship:  
up to € 1,918. 
Cash benefits and benefits in kind 
may be combined. 
 
Social assistance: 
Benefits up to the amount of need. 
Local authorities can provide home-
care, meals on wheels, special aids 
and equipment, adaptations to the 
home and attendance at day care 
centres. 
cash benefits SDI: 
Instead of residential benefits in kind, 
the patient in need of care can decide 
to receive care benefits for a monthly 
amount of: 
 
disability level I: € 205 
disability level II: € 410 
disability level III: € 665 
Cash benefits and benefits in kind 
may be combined. 
 
Social assistance: 
The same benefits as under the long-
term care insurance. 
Attendance Allowance: 
Higher rate: GBP 56.25 (€ 86) 
Lower rate: GBP 37.65 (€ 58) 
Participation of 
the beneficiary 
SDI: 
SDI beneficiaries that do not make 
use of vendor services have to sched-
ule for Pflicht-Plege-Einsätze (advisory 
visits by authorized care providers) at 
least twice a year.. 
 
Social assistance: 
According to income and assets. 
If a disabled person is receiving care 
or other services from the local au-
thority, reasonable charges may be 
made for that care or those services 
depending on ability to pay. 
Taxation Benefits granted under the statutory 
long-term care insurance and under 
guaranteeing minimum resources are 
not subject to taxation for the person 
in need of care. 
Cash benefits and benefits in kind not 
taxable, except Carers Allowance. 
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Financing SDI  
contribution funding 
1,7% SDI contribution rate of the 
earned income, shared equally be-
tween employer and employees and 
rare co-payments  
 
social assistance  
general taxation 
tax funding 
- NHS through general taxation 
- local authorities through govern-
ment grants and council taxes 
- co-payments  
Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/missoc/2003/index_en.htm. Mager 
1999, p. 146-161. Alaszewski et al 2004. Schneider 1999. 
3. The Community Provisions on Social Security  
3.1 Principles of co-ordination of long-term care benefits 
In theory, internationally mobile individuals could retain – or partly retain – 
their claims from insurance or welfare based systems when moving to another 
country, or lose them altogether, depending on the transferability of claims as pro-
vided in the respective systems. The framework for co-ordination of social security 
benefits in case of cross-border mobility in Europe is set up by Community Law. 
The key pieces of EU legislations are the Regulation on Provisions on Social Security 
for Migrant Workers (Reg. 1408/71) and the corresponding co-legislation (Regulation 
No 547/71) (see: Eichenhofer 1998, p. 127). The aim of the two regulations is to 
develop a common international social law and to exempt it from national compe-
tence. Consequently, a member state can no longer insist that its benefits only ap-
ply to its territory and thus may only be consumed there. However, the national 
social policies of each Member State remain one of the key realms of policy compe-
tence where national governments reign supreme (see: Klie/ Krahmer 2003, para. 
34, cipher 5). Basically social legislations of Member States exist independently and 
clearly detached from each other. Community Law merely targets cross-border 
cases.  
The social risk of dependency does not explicitly fall within the material scope of 
art. 4 Reg. 1408/71. Still, case law of the  European Court of Justice has qualified 
allotments in cases of long-term care demands as sickness benefits (see: Hanau/ 
Steinmeyer/ Wank 1990, cipher 13 and ECJ Case C-160/96 of 5 March 1998  -
MOLENAAR). Long-term care benefits are therefore treated as social security benefits, 
regardless of whether they originate from contribution-based/ employment-oriented 
or tax-financed/ residence-oriented systems. Consequently, long-term care benefits 
are within the scope of Reg. 1408/71, irrespective of how they are classified in na-
tional law (see: Landholt 2001, p. 120 et seq. and Schumacher 2001, p. 182). As a 
result, the Council and the European Parliament explicitly allude to long-term care 
benefits within art. 34 Regulation No 883/2004 on the co-ordination of social secu-
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rity systems which was adopted in spring 2004 to fundamentally reform as well as a 
to simplify the rules for co-ordination in the field of social security. 
For the paper at hand, two regulations of the Community Law are of special in-
terest: First of all, the aggregation of qualifying periods for benefits (art. 18 Reg. 
1408/71) and secondly, the principle of exportability of social security benefits (art. 
19 Reg. 1408/71), both of which will be outlined in the following paragraphs. 
The aggregation of periods of insurance, employment or residence is a basic rule 
of Community Law. Art. 18 states that the competent institution of a Member State 
whose legislation makes the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to bene-
fits conditional upon the completion of periods of insurance, employment or resi-
dence shall, to the extent necessary, take account of periods of insurance, employ-
ment or residence completed under the legislation of any other Member State as if 
they were periods completed under the legislation which it administers. 
With regard to the principle of exportability of social security benefits, Commu-
nity Law basically follows the territorial principle: Individuals are subject to the 
statutory provisions of the Member state in whose sovereign territory they are em-
ployed (lex loci laboris). The wording of art. 19 says that an employed or self-
employed person residing in the territory of a Member State other than the compe-
tent State who satisfies the competent state’s condition for entitlement to benefits 
shall receive benefits in the state where s/he is resident: 
(1) benefits in kind are to be provided on behalf of the competent institution (see: 
art.1 (o) Reg. 1408/71) by the institution in the country of residence. The latter dis-
tributes benefits in accordance with the provisions of the legislation it administers 
itself as though the recipient was insured with it; 
(2) cash benefits have to be provided by the competent institution in accordance 
with the legislation which it administers. 
In both cases, the requirements whether or not an individual in need of long-
term care can assert a claim are determined by the protection system of the Mem-
ber State s/he actually belongs to. The set of rules for the provision of benefits in 
kind are determined by the statutory provisions of the state of residence. As a re-
sult, loopholes in an individual’s social coverage may arise if the institution of the 
place of residence (see: art. 1 (p) Reg. 1408/71) does not provide the same sort of 
benefits as the competent institution.  
As a result, co-ordination of European social security systems seems to be lim-
ited by differing services of each Member State which means that effective co-
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ordination calls for adequate ‘homogenisation’ of social policy in the first place (see: 
Eichenhofer 2001, p. 138 and Leibfried/ Pierson 1999, p. 23).  
3.2 Co-ordination between BISMARCK and BEVERIDGE-Systems 
At first glance, the co-ordination of the English and German provisional systems 
for long-term care seems to be complex. For further analysis, it is essential to dis-
tinguish between two cases: (1) If a migrant worker integrates completely into an-
other Member State ’s social protection scheme without any cross-border issues, co-
ordination is manageable. (2) However, the situation seems more difficult if a mi-
grant worker remains in his/ her social protection scheme despite of moving 
abroad. In other words, s/he does not integrate into the social protection scheme of 
his/her receiving country. This problem will be dissolved in the following paragraph 
with the aid of the European co-ordination scheme outlined in section 3.1. 
As established earlier, long-term care benefits are subject to co-ordination ac-
cording to Reg. 1408/71, regardless of their national labelling. As a result, the prin-
ciple of exportability of social security benefits must be applied and possible qualify-
ing periods must be aggregated. Furthermore, the question as to whether long-term 
care benefits classify as special non-contributory benefits arises for two reasons: 
Firstly, special non-contributory benefits are liable to the principle of exportability 
and subject to the general system of co-ordination within the meaning of art. 4 (2a) 
Reg. 1408/71 (see: Landholt 2001, p. 125). Secondly, special non-contributory 
benefits listed in Annex II Part III form part of the opting-out possibility of art. 4 (2b) 
Reg. 1408/71 and are therefore exempted from the European co-ordination scheme 
(see: Lafrenz 2002, p. 19). Moreover, according to art. 10a (1), benefits can be ex-
empted from the principle of exportability if they are listed in Annex IIa Regulation 
No 1408/71. 
The application of the principle of exportability to the German and English bene-
fits for long-term care is illustrated in Table 2.  
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Table 2 – Are national long-term care benefits subject to the principle of exportability? 
 England Germany 
cash benefits 
 
(-) Attendance Allowance  
Ø special non-contributory benefit 
Ø exception to the principle of the ex-
portability (art. 10a (1) and Annex IIa 
Reg. 1408/71) 
(+) Pflegegeld 
Ø treated as a sickness benefit  
Ø subject to the principle of the e x-
portability (art. 19 (1a) Reg. 
1408/71) 
Ø cash-benefits from other Member-
States can possibly be deducted1  
Benefits in 
kind 
(+)  
Ø subject to the principle of the e x-
portability (art. 19 (1a) Reg. 
1408/71) 
Ø from a perspective of the Member 
State, the provision of benefits in 
kind is some sort of social we lfare 
Ø Community Law (Reg.1408/71) is 
applicable (social security benefit) 
(+)  
Ø subject to the principle of the e x-
portability (art. 19 (1a) Reg. 
1408/71)  
Ø services provided on behalf of the 
competent institution by the institu-
tion of the country of residence 
Ø Community Law is not applicable for 
combined benefits of cash and in 
kind components (Kombinationsleis-
tungen, para. 38 SGB XI)1 
1 See: Spitzenverbände der Pflegekassen 2002, p. 34. 
Source: Author 
Germany. According to case law of the European Court of Justice, SDI cash 
benefits are subject to the Regulation on Provisions on Social Security for Migrant 
Workers. Table 2 shows that cash benefits are disbursed to the insured of German 
care funds even if they live abroad. Benefits in kind are restricted to the design of 
long-term care provided on behalf of the competent institution by the institution of 
the receiving country.  
An individual immigrating to Germany has full access to the German provisions 
for long-term care as long as s/he is covered by the sickness insurance of another 
Member State. S/he is not subject to means testing if they draw benefits from the 
SDI.  
England. English long-term care provision and exportability are different from 
the German concept. Cash benefits (Attendance Allowance) are conceived as special 
non-contributory benefits by the opting-out regulation according to art. 10a Reg. 
1408/71. Even though benefits in kind are means-tested and resemble welfare 
benefits, they are classified as special non-contributory benefits within the meaning 
of art. 4 (2a) Reg. No 1408/71. Consequently, these benefits are bound to the prin-
ciple of exportabi lity.  
Individuals moving to England qualify for Attendance Allowance, since it is a 
residence-oriented universal benefit. Moreover, immigrants are entitled to benefits 
in kind according to English law. Consequently, potential care clients have to un-
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dergo financial assessment although their competent institution would grant bene-
fits without financial assessment.  
The following section analyses the European scheme of co-ordination of long-
term care benefits and its impact on individuals’ differential access to long-term 
care provisions in a case-study framework. 
4. Case Studies 
The object of investigation is an individual eligible for legal long-term care bene-
fits. In a first step, the case-studies outline a cross national perspective by analys-
ing similar situations in England in Germany. But the analysis does not centre on 
national policies. In a second step, the interactions of Member States’ policies and 
Community Law in the case of mobility of a benefit recipient are briefly outlined and 
the resulting microeconomic effects on the financial budget of the mobile care client 
are presented. The approach is applied to two scenarios – one about cash benefits 
and the other about benefits in kind. The case-studies are subject to the following 
assumptions: 
- The individuals investigated are senior citizens (persons aged 65 or over4), in 
need of long-term care. These model care clients are integrated into the co-
ordination framework since they are covered by the social security system of 
a Member State. (see: Frenz 2004, p. 589 cipher 1537).  
- The migrating individuals do not integrate into the social protection schemes 
of the receiving Member State . These non-integrators reside in one Member 
State and are insured in another. The paper at hand refers to non-integrators 
as non-active persons, e.g. pensioners, survivors, students and/ or family 
members of the above mentioned persons. (see: Reyes 2003, p. 16) 
- The object of investigation is solely the legal provision of long-term care. 
Other subsidiary systems remain out of consideration.  
- The status quo of the current policy regimes is assumed to be the fictitious 
underlying body of legislation.  
- Neither financing, nor quality, nor take-up of benefits are considered.  
- The care needed can be provided through legal amounts. Further private out-
of-pocket payment is frequently required but not subject of the present case 
studies.  
                                                 
4 Attendance Allowance is only granted to people aged 65 or over, whereas the German SDI has no age 
limit. 
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4.1 Case Study 1: Cash Benefits 
Cash benefits are generally provided by the competent institution in accordance 
with the legislation which it administers. England and Germany handle the provi-
sion, the financing and the type of long-term care cash benefits differently. Table 3 
summarises the different eligibility requirements for cash benefits. 
Table 3 - Eligibility requirements for cash benefits 
 Germany England  
benefit Pflegegeld (para. 37 SGB XI) 
(monthly) 
Attendance Allowance  
(weekly)  
financing 1,7 per cent contribution rate from 
earned income, paid at par by em-
ployer and employee 
tax financed  
financial assessment no no 
age qualification no yes, persons aged 65 or over 
qualifying conditions - provision is dependent on the 
membership in a care fund 
- since 1.1.2000: the applicant 
must have a minimum record of 
five year insurance with a care 
fund within the last ten years 
- disability 
 
- the three primary qualifying condi-
tions which apply to AA are  
1. age (>65), and  
2. residence and presence , and  
3. disability.  
- the applicant must have been  in 
need for help for at least six 
months 
definition of depend-
ency  
in need for long term care within the 
meaning of para. 14 and 15 SGB XI 
(Pflegebedürftigkeit): limited in  
- activities of daily living (ADL) and 
- instrumental activity of daily living 
for at least 6 months  
 
no legal definition 
AA is a benefit designed to help se-
verely disabled people who need 
from other persons 
1. attention, or 
2. supervision, or  
3. watching over. 
help needed - minimum help with two ADL and 
with one IADL 
- subject to dependency level: 
minimum help with ADL once a 
day and minimum help with IADL 
once a week. 
help with 
- activities of daily living („main 
meal test“)  
- bodily functions and personal 
hygiene 
- ingestion 
guidelines for screen-
ing 
screening is carried out through the 
medical service of the health funds 
according to care survey guidelines 
(Begutachtungsrichtlinien) 
generally no, however there can be  
screenings in individual cases 
 
designation for a spe-
cific use 
no no 
Source: Author, according to SGB XI and Decision Makers Guide Vol. 10. 
Pflegegeld and Attendance Allowance are comparable although they are part of two 
different social systems. Moreover, for both (types of) cash benefits the level of pay-
ment correlates positively with dependencies of the individual and the respective 
care needed. German law knows three disability levels, whereas English regulations 
specify two: Attendance Allowance is payable at a higher rate if a person needs help 
both day and night and at a lower rate if a person needs either day or night care. 
English disability levels can be subsumed under the German terminology of para. 
15 (1), SGB XI. Table 4 compares the two cash benefits.   
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Table 4 – Comparable disability levels and monthly benefits5 
Germany England 
disability level benefit disability level benefit 
low 
(Pflegestufe 1) 
205 EUR 
(136.67 GBP) 
day or night 225.90 EUR 
(150.60 GBP) 
medium 
(Pflegestufe 2) 
410 EUR 
(273.33 GBP) 
day or night 225.90 EUR 
(150.60 GBP) 
severe  
(Pflegestufe 3) 
665 EUR 
(443.33 GBP) 
day and night 337.50EUR 
(225.00 GBP) 
Source: Author 
Supposing that the purchasing power6 in both countries is about the same, a Ger-
man individual in need of care is worse off at disability level “low” than his/ her 
English counterpart. At all other disability levels this assessment is diametrically 
converse. 
Migration from Germany to England. In the course of migration from one Member 
State to another, dependency becomes a cross-border issue. Table 5 outlines the 
relevant characteristics of the situation. 
Table 5 – Pflegegeld: Germany as competent state and England as state of residence 
disability level expected cash benefit  
the immigrant will re-
ceive in England 
difference to the situa-
tion in Germany 
difference to regular 
cash benefit in England 
(Attendance Allowance) 
low 
(Pflegestufe 1) 
225.90 EUR 
(150.60 GBP) 
+20.90 EUR 
(13.93 GBP) 
nil 
medium 
(Pflegestufe 2) 
410 EUR 
(273.33 GBP) 
nil +184.10 EUR 
(122.73 GBP) 
severe  
(Pflegestufe 3) 
665 EUR 
(443.33 GBP) 
nil +327.50 EUR 
(218.33 GBP) 
Source: Author 
The second column shows the expected cash benefits in the receiving country. Each 
of these amounts consists of two components: First of all, the person in need of 
long-term care is eligible for cash benefits from the German SDI, and secondly, 
his/her new place of residence grants Attendance Allowance. Since legislation ad-
ministered by the English institution does not make arrangements for reductions or 
retirement provisions, the foreign benefit in the form of Attendance Allowance is 
fully deducted from the German Pflegegeld (see: Spitzenverbände der Pflegekassen 
2002, p. 34). As a result, a dependent individual at disability level “low” receives 
more than his/ her immobile German equivalent. At disability level “medium” or 
“severe” his/ her position remains the same, but the benefit is partly drawn from 
both countries.  
                                                 
5 Currency calculations are  based on an exchange rate of 1.5 EUR/GBP, approached to the June 2004 
22-day-average of 1.50499 EUR and the July 2004 7-day-average of 1.49681 EUR. 
6 See HICP – Health – Index (1996=100) of EUROSTAT: Germany HICP 129.5 and United Kingdom 
HICP 126.2 (5/2004) (Source: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/queen/display.do?screen=detail&language=en&prod
uct=EUROIND&root=EUROIND/shorties/euro_cp/cp060). 
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The third column shows the differences in usual cash benefits in Germany. The last 
column illustrates the differences in regular cash benefits provided in England as 
well as the actually paid benefit from German care funds. Taking a closer look at 
the immigrant to England (column 2) and his/ her English counterpart (column 4) 
with disability level “medium” or “severe” shows that the principle of horizontal eq-
uity is not accomplished. The emigrant is better off than the comparable persons in 
need of care in the receiving country.  
Migration from England to Germany. In the case of laterally reversed migration 
Attendance Allowance is excluded from the principle of exportability within the 
meaning of art. 10a (1) Reg. 1408/71. According to the Deutschen Verbindungsstelle 
Krankenversicherung – Ausland (the division for foreign affairs of the German health 
funds alliance), the immigrant is eligible for German cash benefits (Pflegegeld). S/he 
could as well be eligible for benefits in kind, however this section is about financial 
allotments, only. The former will be  analysed in section 4.2. 
At disability level “medium” or “severe” the immigrant in need of long-term care is 
better off in Germany than in England. The individual financial improvement is dis-
played in the last column of Table 5. Consequently, the mirror migration meets the 
principle of horizontal equity in the receiving country. 
As a result, the amounts of long-term care cash benefits vary when it comes to 
cross-border issues between England and Germany. Depending on the disability 
level and the destination country, the individual long-term care budget can change 
for the be tter or the worse. 
4.2 Case Study 2: Benefits in kind  
The object of investigation of the second case study are benefits in kind for home 
care services. Following an overview in table 6 comparing the country-specific eligi-
bility requirements for home care services, an analytic framework is presented and 
effects of migration are evaluated.  
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Table 6 - Eligibility requirements for benefits in kind 
 Germany England  
benefit benefits in kind for home care servi-
ces (Pflegesachleistung bei häuslicher 
Pflege, para. 36 SGB XI) 
community-based social home care 
services for older people  
age qualification no no 
financing 1.7 per cent contribution rate from 
earned income, paid par by employer 
and employee 
- tax financed 
- following a financial assessment 
care clients are charged for ser-
vices 
financial assessment no - yes 
- the first six weeks home care 
services are free of charge (fi-
nancial assessment period) 
qualifying conditions - provision is dependent on the 
membership in a care fund 
- since 1.1.2000: the applicant 
must have a minimum record of 
five year insurance with a care 
fund within the last ten years 
- disability 
- residence or presence in Eng-
land 
 
definition of depend-
ency 
in need for long term care within the 
meaning of para. 14 and 15 SGB XI 
(Pflegebedürftigkeit): limited in  
- activities of daily living (ADL) and 
- instrumental activity of daily living 
for at least 6 months  
 
Home care is for people age 16 and 
over including: 
- older people (over 65);    
- older people who are me ntally 
frail (over 65);  
- people with mental health prob-
lems (16 -65);  
- people with learning disabilities 
(16 -65);  
- people with physical disabilities 
(16 -65);    
- people with visual impairments 
(16 and over); and  
- people with hearing impairments 
(16 and over).  
guidelines for screen-
ing 
screening is carried out by the medi-
cal service of the health funds ac-
cording to care survey guidelines 
(Begutachtungsrichtlinien) 
a social worker screens the potential 
care client 
 
Source: Author 
An analytic framework can be based on the German Dependency Insurance Act 
which characterises a care client with a substantial functional dependency (para. 
15, SGB XI). In Germany, nearly 57 per cent of all care clients in need of home care 
require a substantial  degree of assistance in performing activities of daily living 
(ADL) (see: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und soziale Sicherung 2004, 
www.bmgs.de). The fact of substantial dependency implies daily help with at least 
two activities, including dressing, moving or personal hygiene and help with addi-
tional support, such as housekeeping on a weekly basis. The Dependency Insurance 
Act sets a minimum time input at 10.5 hours per week for care, at least half of 
which has to be disposed for basic care needs (para. 15 (3), SGB XI). English law 
does not include a comparable precise circumscription for care needs. However, the 
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weekly time input can be used for an indicator for drawing a comparison between 
the different systems.  
Before granting home care services free of charge, English law administers financial 
assessment for a potential care client. Using the COUNTY OF CUMBRIA for reference, 
the means-test for home care services is executed as follows: 
The first six weeks of home care are provided free of charge. During this period, a 
Financial Assessment Officer will gather information about the care  client’s finan-
cial circumstances in order to assess if s/he has to pay a contribution after these 
first six weeks. Three things are considered when calculating the care client’s con-
tribution to the cost of home care: income, capital assets and allowances. Income 
includes all money the individual in need receives on a regular basis or payment 
which relates to a particular period of time. A weekly mandatory allowance of 
191.45 EUR (127.63 GBP) is being allocated in all cases. There are several other 
allowances which are not considered in the paper at hand. Assets include savings, 
stocks, shares and any property (apart from the care client’s home). If the total of 
financial assets is more than 29,250 EUR (19,500 GBP), the care client will be held 
to pay the full charge up to a weekly maximum of 225 EUR (150 GBP). Accordingly, 
the dependent individual has to pay up to 15 hours weekly by him-/herself, given 
that the hourly rate for care amounts to some15 EUR (10 GBP) . If capital assets 
total between 18,000 EUR (12,000 GBP) and 29,250 EUR (19,000 GBP), the care 
client is expected to make a contribution to his/ her charge from his/ her capital. 
This is called a “tariff”. It is calculated from the amount of the individual’s assets 
and included as income. If the financial assets total less than 18,000 EUR (12,000 
GBP) they will have no effect on the assessment. (see: Cumbria County Council 
Social Services (edt.) 2003, p. 7 et sqq.) 
In order to carry out a financial assessment in the case study at hand, the care cli-
ent is endowed with income and capital. Precisely, the dependent person’s monthly 
income is feigned with 1,154.10 EUR (770 GBP)7. Capital is variable by assumption. 
In Table 7 the financial assessment procedure is applied to the model care client 
with a fixed income and a weekly care need of 10 hours (weekly charge of 150 EUR 
or 100 GBP), assuming different levels of capital assets.  
                                                 
7 The amount represents the average of the income of a standardized German pensioner (Eckrentner) 
with a monthly pension of 1,175.85 EUR (2004) and the mean income over all English pensioners of 
the census „The average incomes of pensioner units 2003/04“ of a weekly 189 GBP (1,134.00 EUR 
monthly). (Balchin/Shah (eds.): The pensioner’s Income Series 2002/03, 13). 
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Table 7 – Monthly income of an English care client in weekly need of 10 hours of care  
capital  assets  monthly income after finan-
cial assessment of which 
home care has to be paid 
 
monthly charge  
for home care 
 
remaining monthly 
income after care 
charge (excluding the 
mandatory allowance) 
0-18,000 EUR 
(0 – 12,000 GBP) 
380.24 EUR 
(253.48 GBP) 
380.24 EUR 
(253.48 GBP) 
nil 
18,000 EUR 
(12,000 GBP) 
674,24 EUR 
(449.48 GBP) 
600 EUR 
(400 GBP) 
74.24 EUR 
(49.48 GBP) 
29,250 EUR 
(19,500 GBP) 
854.24EUR 
 (569.68 GBP) 
600 EUR 
(400 GBP) 
254.24 EUR 
(169.68 GBP) 
Source: Author 
Table 7 shows that, after financial assessment and charge for care services, be-
tween 0 and 254.24 EUR (169.68 GBP) are left (excluding the mandatory allow-
ance). Taking a look at direct costs for the provision of home care, the dependent 
individual is charged between 380.24 EUR (253.48 GBP) and 600 EUR (400 GBP) 
for his/ her care needs. Within the first interval of 0-18.000 EUR (0-12.000 GBP), 
the capital assets are not subject to financial assessment and the individual’s in-
come is not sufficient to compensate for all care costs. Therefore local authorities 
are responsible for the remaining sum.  
In contrast, the German care client with a substantial functional dependency re-
ceives (Pflegestufe I) monthly benefits in kind to the value of 384 EUR (256 GBP). 
Assuming that the benefit in kind covers all individual care needs, the entire in-
come of 1,154.10 EUR (770.52 GBP) remains untouched with given capital assets. 
Despite comparable financial endowments of the model care clients in England and 
in Germany, each of them features different individual monetary positions. Table 8 
draws a direct comparison between the income of the model care client in England 
and in Germany, depending on his/ her individual capital assets. The German indi-
vidual is better off in any case. 
Table 8 –Comparison of the individual financial positions in England and in Germany after 
charges for home care services 
capital assets England: remaining monthly 
income including mandatory 
allowance 
Germany: remaining monthly 
income 
0-18,000 EUR 
(0 – 12,000 GBP) 
765.78 EUR 
(510.52 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
18,000 EUR 
(12,000 GBP) 
840.02 EUR 
(560 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
29,250 EUR 
(19,500 GBP) 
1,020.02 EUR 
(680.20 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
Source: Author 
Migration from Germany to England. In the stated scenario, an individual in need 
of long-term care migrates from a scheme with mandatory and universal long-term 
care insurance to a system without explicit long-term care provisions. Depending on 
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his/ her capital assets, the migrating care client experiences a financial loss which 
is displayed in Table 9. Opportunity costs resulting from the loss of advantages of 
the German system are undocumented. Remarkably enough, dependent individuals 
with low capital assets are disadvantaged the most when migrating from Germany 
to England. Still, the principle of horizontal equity in the receiving country is ful-
filled. 
Table 9 – Home care: Financial loss when migrating from Germany to England 
capital assets Germany: remaining 
monthly income 
England: remaining 
monthly income includ-
ing mandatory allow-
ance 
financial loss suffered 
0-18,000 EUR 
(0 – 12,000 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
765.78 EUR 
(510.52 GBP) 
388.32 EUR 
(260 GBP) 
18,000 EUR 
(12,000 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
840.02 EUR 
(560 GBP) 
314.08 EUR 
(210.52 GBP) 
29,250 EUR 
(19,500 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
1,020.02 EUR 
(680.20 GBP) 
134.08 EUR 
(90.32 GBP) 
Source: Author 
Migration from England to Germany. In the mirror migration the financial situa-
tion of the model care client improves. Table 10 shows the payable amounts relating 
to the individual’s capital assets. Especially poorer individuals are proportionally 
advantaged by migration between England and Germany. Table 10 does not ac-
count for the benefits in kind of the German Social Depe ndency Insurance, since 
they are provided free of charge to the model care client.  
Table 10 - Home care: Financial betterment when migrating from Germany to England 
capital assets Germany: remaining 
monthly income 
England: remaining 
monthly income includ-
ing mandatory allow-
ance 
financial betterment 
gained 
0-18,000 EUR 
(0 – 12,000 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
765.78 EUR 
(510.52 GBP) 
388.32 EUR 
(260 GBP) 
18,000 EUR 
(12,000 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
840.02 EUR 
(560 GBP) 
314.08 EUR 
(210.52 GBP) 
29,250 EUR 
(19,500 GBP) 
1,154.10 EUR  
(770.52 GBP) 
1,020.02 EUR 
(680.20 GBP) 
134.08 EUR 
(90.32 GBP) 
Source: Author 
As a result, migration which is directed from the English to the German system of 
long-term care takes a positive effect on the financial position of the model care cli-
ent whereas the mirror migration bears a negative one. In both cases the principle 
of horizontal equity is met in the receiving country since the emigrant is neither 
better nor worth off than the comparable native care client. 
5. Conclusion 
The European co-ordination scheme for social security concedes as much self-
determination to each Member States’ system as possible. At the same time, EU 
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endeavours aim at homogenisation of social security schemes in order to avoid dis-
advantages or privileges of migrant workers.  
Bearing the aims of Community Law in mind, the co-ordination of long-term care 
benefits in kind and cash between a BISMARCK and a BEVERIDGE system brings 
about surprising effects. Two case studies show that the present co-ordination 
scheme has not proved satisfactory results for bringing together contribution-
based/ employment-oriented and tax-financed/ residence-oriented systems. At the 
least, the co-ordination of long-term care benefits does not seem to fulfil expecta-
tions and thus requires improvement. Undoubtedly, more harmonisation could 
smooth out the shortcomings of co-ordination and give migrants more security 
about the consequences of transference to a foreign social security system.  
The framework presented above is a starting point for further research of possible 
microeconomic effects. It shows the basic direction for future investigation by stat-
ing principal thoughts about equity, efficiency and migration. 
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